(Spanish) RESUMEN: La libertad absoluta postulada por Viktor Emil Frankl y Jean-Paul Sartre, la Shoah y la creencia en un dios omnipotente, bueno y justo parecen contradecirse. La pregunta por el sentido del sufrimiento de las víctimas del Holocausto (la verdadera catástrofe, el mayor crimen contra la humanidad), simbolizado por Auschwitz, y como punto de inflexión en la historia, es terriblemente dolorosa y parece no tener una respuesta filosófica ni teológica. A mi juicio, es importantísimo distinguir entre (...) las víctimas inocentes de la Shoah que perecieron y las víctimas inocentes que sufrieron un verdadero infierno y perdieron a sus seres queridos, pero que lograron sobrevivir. Ambas son víctimas, por supuesto, pero así como encontrarle un posible sentido al sufrimiento de las víctimas masacradas y gaseadas podría suponer un insulto a su sufrimiento y agonía –en especial, al horror que sufrieron los niños–, el horrible sufrimiento de los supervivientes pudo dar, tal vez, de alguna manera, un sentido a sus vidas después de la liberación de los campos de concentración y exterminio, ya fuera como voz, como protesta o como simple supervivencia. Frankl apuesta por un sentido último (que abraza el sentido del sufrimiento de las víctimas), y Sartre, aunque parezca no apostar por sentido alguno, volcó su vida al compromiso político después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, y ello parece vislumbrar una minúscula pizca de sentido después de la barbarie. La filosofía de Frankl es un sí a la vida incluso en las situaciones más extremas, un grito casi nietzscheano que exalta el valor de la vida más allá de cualquier sufrimiento. Frankl, padre de la logoterapia y superviviente del Holocausto, abre una puerta a Dios al hablar de un dios inconsciente, una dimensión suprahumana y una fe incondicional, y define la religión como espiritualidad y como la búsqueda del hombre por el sentido último. Según Frankl, la libertad no se contradice con Dios, y la religión existe no a raíz de la barbarie, sino a pesar de la barbarie. El existencialismo sartreano es una filosofía de la libertad radical y de la responsabilidad. El hombre está condenado a ser libre. El ser humano es un ser en el que la existencia precede a la esencia. Somos totalmente responsables de lo que somos. Sartre afirma que la libertad humana es incompatible con Dios. En un mundo sin Dios, la moral la construyen los hombres, con sus propias decisiones y sus acciones, y la existencia y el sufrimiento de las víctimas no tienen sentido alguno. Sartre define al hombre como libertad, responsabilidad, angustia y contingencia. Frankl define al hombre como libertad, responsabilidad, espiritualidad y búsqueda de sentido. Con esta tesis me propongo entrar en la resbaladiza dimensión del dolor, la desesperación, el sentido y sinsentido del sufrimiento de las víctimas (teniendo presente los horrores de Auschwitz, que en teología y filosofía ha simbolizado desde la liberación de los campos la muerte de Dios y la muerte de la moral). Es verdad que no solo los hombres, mujeres y niños judíos fueron víctimas de la barbarie alemana, pero, como reza el mensaje de Elie Wiesel en la exposición permanente del Block 27 del Auschwitz-Birkeanu State Museum: "Not all victims were Jewish in this place, but all Jews were victims". La Shoah no es un episodio dentro de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, sino un punto de inflexión en la historia de la humanidad, y es una catástrofe que nos concierne a todos, hombres y mujeres judíos y no judíos, religiosos e irreligiosos, creyentes e increyentes, como seres libres, responsables y morales que somos –o que deberíamos ser. Muchas de las víctimas del Holocausto, en medio de la desesperación, entraron en las cámaras de gas orando, aferrándose a la esperanza de que ese final espeluznante no era un punto final. Con esta tesis no me propongo de ninguna manera responder a la eterna pregunta de si Dios existe o no, sino que propongo interpretar ese grito hacia Dios como un desesperado anhelo de esperanza. También me propongo encontrar una coherencia en las posturas de estos dos grandes pensadores para quienes la libertad y la responsabilidad definen al hombre: Frankl (quien apuesta por una dimensión suprahumana donde existe un sentido último en el que el sufrimiento de las víctimas tiene que tener algún sentido, aunque ese sentido sea completamente incomprensible en la dimensión humana) y Sartre (el existencialista ateo por excelencia, para quien el mundo, la existencia y el sufrimiento son absolutamente contingentes). En el primer capítulo expongo la logoterapia y el existencialismo sartreano: describo las tres dimensiones del hombre y las tres búsquedas de sentido propuestas por Frankl, y expongo las cinco consecuencias de "l'existence précède l'essence", centrándome en la libertad y la responsabilidad, y hablo del suicidio. El segundo capítulo está dedicado al dios inconsciente frankleano, la dimensión suprahumana, la búsqueda por el sentido último y la fe incondicional. En el tercer capítulo ilustro la libertad sin Dios sartreana, la ontología sartreana, el ateísmo sartreano y el humanismo sartreano, y hablo sobre la responsabilidad, la mauvaise foi, la contingencia, la situation y la angustia. El cuarto capítulo es necesariamente histórico (sin dejar de ser filosófico): me pregunto por la muerte de Dios después de Auschwitz, argumento y defiendo la unicidad del Holocausto (la Shoah es un punto de inflexión en la historia de la humanidad), describo las masacres antes de los campos de exterminio (Einsatzgruppen, Ordnungspolizei y Wehrmacht), el gigantesco complejo de Auschwitz (Stammlager, Auschwitz-Birkenau y Monowitz-Buna), reflexiono sobre Dios y el mal (centrándome en los niños de Auschwitz), describo los días de Frankl en Auschwitz, hablo de Dios como esperanza, de la inmortalidad y la escatología, de la crueldad de Dios, de la relación entre el cristianismo y el antisemitismo, del islam y el antisemitismo, critico el silencio de Dios, hablo de la muerte de Dios y del juicio contra Dios. En el quinto capítulo expongo la moral frankleana (una moral que atañe al hombre y no a Dios), basándome en su teoría del amor y en su única obra de teatro (Synchronisation in Binkerwald), y la moral sartreana (una moral que atañe a una humanidad sin Dios), recordando a Dostoyevsky, analizando la famosa cita de Garcin en Huis clos "L'enfer, c'est les Autres", criticando el marxismo de Sartre y cuestionando (con la mirada de Frankl y Sartre) el verso de Brecht "Erst kommt das Fressen, dann kommt die Moral"; al final del capítulo incluyo una reflexión propia y las críticas frankleana y sartreana sobre la impunidad de los verdugos y colaboradores después del Holocausto (con el permiso de Dios). Después de la Conclusión, añado un Apéndice sobre las vidas de Frankl y Sartre, para poder entender mejor su obra. PALABRAS CLAVE: logoterapia, existencialismo sartreano, búsqueda de sentido, libertad, responsabilidad, moral, angustia, sufrimiento, supervivientes, víctimas, contingencia, espiritualidad, religión, Dios, esperanza, antisemitismo, culpa, Auschwitz, Holocausto, Shoah. /// (English) ABSTRACT: The absolute freedom defended by Viktor Emil Frankl and Jean-Paul Sartre, the Shoah and the belief in an omnipotent, benevolent and just God seem to contradict each other. The question of the meaning of the victims' suffering of the Holocaust (the true catastrophe, the biggest crime against humanity), simbolised by Auschwitz and as a turning point in History, is terribly painful and doesn't seem to have an answer. In my opinion, it's crucial to distinguish between the innocent victims of the Shoah who perished and the innocent victims who sufferend a real hell and lost their loved ones, but managed to survive. Both are victims, of course, but just as finding a possible meaning to the suffering of the massacred and gassed victims could result in an insult to their suffering and agony –especially to the horror that the children suffered– the gigantic suffering of the survivors could, maybe, somehow, give a meaning to their lives after the liberation of the concentration and extermination camps, either as a voice, as a protest, or as a simple survival. Frankl believes in an ultimate meaning (that embraces the meaning of the victims' suffering), and Sartre, even if it appears not to embrace any meaning, turned his life to political engagement after War World II, and that attitude seems to give a tiny glimpse of meaning after the barbarity. Frankl's philosophy says yes to life even in the most extreme situations, and it's a Nietzschean-like scream that exalts the value of life beyond any monstrous suffering. Frankl, the father of logotherapy and a Holocaust survivor, opens a door to God when he talks about an unconscious God, a supra-human dimension and an unconditional faith; he defines religion as spirituality and as man's search for ultimate meaning. According to Frankl, freedom is not contradictory with God, and religion exists not because of the barbarity but in spite of the barbarity. Sartrean existentialism is a philosophy of radical freedom and responsibility. Men are condemned to be free. We are beings where the existence precedes the essence. We are completely responsible of what we are. Sartre argues that human freedom is incompatible with God. In a godless world, morality is constructed by people, with their own choices and actions, and human existence and the suffering of the victims don't have any meaning. Sartre defines man as freedom, responsibility, Angst and contingency. Frankl defines man as freedom, responsibility, spirituality and search for meaning. With this dissertation I attempt to enter in the slippery dimension of the pain, despair, meaning and meaninglessness of the victims' suffering (having in mind the horrors of Auschwitz, that in theology and in philosophy have simbolised, since the liberation of the camps, the death of God and the death of morality). It's true that not only Jewish men, women and children were victims of the German barbarity, but, as Elie Wiesel's message from the permanent exhibition from Block 27 of the Auschwitz-Birkeanu State Museum reads: "Not all victims were Jewish in this place, but all Jews were victims". The Shoah is not an episode inside War World II, but a turning point in the history of humankind, and a catastrophe that embraces us all, Jewish and not not Jewish men and women, religious and not religious, believers and not believers, as the free, responsible and moral beings that we all are –or that we should be. A lot of the victims, in the midst of their desperation, entered into the gas chambers praying, holding to the hope that their horrifying end was not the ultimate end. With this dissertation I do not attempt to answer the eternal question of the existence of God, rather, I will try to interpret that scream to God as a longing for hope. I also intend to find a coherence between the thought of these two great thinkers for whom freedom and responsibilty define man: Frankl (who argues that there is a suprahuman dimension where an ultimate meaning exists and where the victims' suffering has to have a meaning, even if this meaning is completely incomprehensible in the human dimension) and Sartre (the atheist existentialist par excellence, for whom the world, human existence and suffering are absolutely contingent). In the first chapter I expose logotherapy and Sartrean existentialism: I describe the three dimensions of man, the three searches for meaning, the five consequences of "l'existence précède l'essence" and I speak about suicide. The second chapter delves into the unconscious God, the supra-human dimension, the ultimate meaning and the unconditional faith. In the third chapter I expose the freedom without God defended by Sartre, Sartre's ontology, Sartre's atheism, Sartre's humanism, and his ideas about responsibility, mauvaise foi, contingency, situation, and Angst. The fourth chapter is necessarily historical (while being philosophical too): I wonder about the death of God after Auschwitz, I argue and defend the uniqueness of the Holocaust (the Shoah is a turning point in the history of humankind), I describe the massacres before the extermination camps (Einsatzgruppen, Ordnungspolizei y Wehrmacht), the gigantic Auschwitz camp complex (Stammlager, Auschwitz-Birkenau y Monowitz-Buna), I reflect on God and evil (focusing on the children of Auschwitz), I describe Frankl's days in Auschwitz, I talk about God as hope, about immortality and escathology, I discuss God's cruelty, the relationship between Christianity and antisemitism and Islam and antisemitism, I question the silence of God, and I talk about the death of God and about the trial against God. In the fifth chapter I talk about the Franklean morality (a morality that concerns man and not God), on the basis of his love theory and his only work of theater (Synchronisation in Binkerwald), and the Sartrean morality (a morality that concerns a humanity without God), remembering Dostoyevsky, analysing Garcin's famous quote in Huis clos "L'enfer, c'est les Autres", crticizing Sartre's marxism and questioning (with Frankl's and Sartre's eyes) Brecht's verse "Erst kommt das Fressen, dann kommt die Moral"; at the end of the chapter I include my own reflection (and Frankl and Sartre's critique) about the impunity of the executioners and collaborators after the Holocaust (with God's permission). After the Conclusion, I add an Appendix about the lives of Frankl and Sartre, which helps understanding better their work. KEYWORDS: logotherapy, existentialism, search for meaning, freedom, responsibility, morality, Angst, suffering, survivors, victims, contingency, spirituality, religion, God, hope, antisemitism, guilt, Auschwitz, Holocaust, Shoah. (shrink)

Das sinnvolle Leben ist nicht nur in der gegenwärtigen Philosophie wieder verstärkt ein Thema, sondern auch in Psychiatrie und Psychotherapie. Bereits seit langer Zeit jedoch spielt es eine zentrale Rolle in der Existenzanalyse und Logotherapie, die der Psychiater Viktor E. Frankl entwickelt hat. Frankls eigenständige Sinntheorie wird in der gegenwärtigen philosophischen Sinndebatte allerdings weitestgehend ignoriert. Das Ziel dieses Artikels ist es, diesen Zustand zu beenden und die heutige philosophische Sinndebatte mit Frankl ins Gespräch zu bringen. Einerseits geht (...) es darum, Frankls Sinntheorie im Lichte der philosophischen Sinndebatte zu verstehen und zu bewerten: Was für eine Art von Sinntheorie vertritt er? Wie ist sie einzuordnen? Wie steht es um ihre innere Kohärenz, die Plausibilität seiner sinntheoretischen Überzeugungen und die Qualität ihrer Begründung? Andererseits soll geprüft werden, inwiefern Frankls Ansatz die gegenwärtige philosophische Sinndiskussion voranbringen kann: Gibt es bei ihm theoretische Elemente, die in der Philosophie zu wenig Beachtung finden? Kann er der philosophischen Sinntheorie wichtige Impulse geben? Die Analyse folgt in ihrer Struktur wesentlichen Elementen der Frankl’schen Sinntheorie, von den grundlegenden formalen und metaethischen Aspekten hin zu inhaltlichen Bestimmungen des Sinns und dem individuellen Umgang mit ihm: Zunächst wird die zentrale Bedeutung des Sinns für das menschliche Leben thematisiert, dann Fragen nach der metaethischen Einordnung, nämlich nach der subjektivistischen oder objektivistischen Ausrichtung sowie der Rolle des Supernaturalismus. Dann stehen mit der Selbsttranszendenz und dem Wertebezug sowie den drei Wertkategorien wesentliche Elemente der Sinnkonstituierung im Fokus der Betrachtung. Die Ergebnisse werden im Schlusskapitel zusammengefasst. Es zeigt sich, dass der theoretische Austausch in beide Richtungen fruchtbar sein kann, Frankls Denken allerdings auch einige Hindernisse bereithält. Sein Ansatz entpuppt sich mit seinem objektivistischen Charakter und der zentralen Rolle von Selbsttranszendenz und Wertbezug als an die heutige Sinndiskussion gut anschlussfähig, seine oftmals fehlenden Begründungen hingegen als gravierender methodischer Makel, bei dem eine Orientierung an modernen philosophischen Standards wünschenswert wäre. Wiederholt entsteht der Eindruck, dass seine Sinntheorie maßgeblich durch sein praktisches, therapeutisches Interesse geprägt ist. Einigen seiner Theoreme wird das Potential zugesprochen, die philosophische Sinntheorie bereichern zu können: Das sind die Situativität und Individualität des Sinns sowie die Gegebenheit der Sinnmöglichkeiten und die Verantwortung für ihre Verwirklichung. (shrink)

RESUMEN: Viktor Frankl es el pensador del sentido y de la esperanza. Superviviente del Holocausto, perdió a sus padres, a su hermano y a su mujer en la Shoah. Frankl jamás se rindió al desaliento y apostó por ser optimista a pesar de la tríada trágica de la vida (el sufrimiento, la culpa y la muerte). Su tesis es un sí a la vida con mayúsculas: el ser humano es un ser en busca de sentido, y la (...) vida siempre tiene sentido, bajo cualquier circunstancia. Esta bella tesis es, sin embargo, un tanto problemática en un escenario tan espeluznante como la Shoah. Frankl define al ser humano como libertad, responsabilidad, espiritualidad y búsqueda de sentido. El presente artículo expone la logoterapia bajo una perspectiva filosófica, incluye un recorrido histórico-biográfico desde el Anschluss hasta la liberación, reflexiona sobre la búsqueda por el sentido y el sentido del sufrimiento, y muestra cómo algunas de las tesis de Frankl pudieron ayudar a algunas víctimas en los campos de concentración alemanes (jamás en los campos de exterminio alemanes ni en las masacres de los Einsatzgruppen) y cómo pueden ser un antídoto contra la desesperación y el suicidio. /// -/- ABSTRACT: Viktor Frankl is the thinker of meaning and hope. He was a Holocaust survivor and lost his parents, his brother and his wife in the Shoah. Frankl never surrendered to hopelessness and committed to optimism despite the tragic triad of life (suffering, guilt and death). His thesis is a yes to life in capital letters: human beings are beings in search of meaning, and life always has meaning, whatever the circumstances. This beautiful thesis is, nevertheless, a bit problematic in a gruesome scenario such as the Shoah. Frankl defines human beings as freedom, responsibility, spirituality and search for meaning. The present paper discusses logotherapy from a philosophical perspective, includes a historical-biographical note since the Anschluss until the liberation, reflects on the search for meaning and the meaning of suffering, and shows how some of Frankl's thesis may have been useful to some victims in the German concentration camps (never in the German extermination camps or in the massacres of the Einsatzgruppen) and how they can be an antidote against despair and suicide. (shrink)

According to Viktor Frankl, although people are not always free to choose the conditions in which they find themselves, they are always free to choose their attitude towards these conditions and, thus, are always free to find their lives meaningful. This basic tenet of Frankl’s theory is also often repeated approvingly in the secondary literature. I argue that the claim is wrong; not all people are free to find their lives meaningful. Counterexamples include people who suffer from (...) severe depression or people who, due to lack of sufficient intelligence, ability to focus, or determination cannot profit from psychological counseling (including logotherapeutic counseling). I also criticize Frankl’s oft-repeated argument that some people’s success in finding their lives meaningful in the concentration camps shows that all people are free to find their lives meaningful. Frankl’s discussion of the noetic dimension and its relation to other dimensions of the human personality is also insufficient for defending his claim about all people’s freedom to find their lives meaningful. Frankl’s theory of the noos suggests that all people’s lives are meaningful. But since not all people’s lives are meaningful, Frankl’s claims about the noos seem incorrect: either some people do not have (or are not also) a noetic dimension or the noetic dimension does not always endow life with meaning. Further, the claim that, thanks to all people’s noetic dimension, all people’s lives are already meaningful is in tension with the claim that all people can wrest meaning from life. I suggest that understanding Frankl as only claiming that all people have a potential for meaningful lives is also unhelpful. Finally, I discuss the implications of my criticism for Frankl’s theory at large. I argue that much in this very helpful theory can be retained, but identify those aspects of the theory that need to be modified. (shrink)

En este artículo abordamos los conceptos de «salud» y «enfermedad» tal y como han sido entendidos en el seno de la Logoterapia del psiquiatravienés Viktor Frankl, uno de los métodos psicoterapéuticos más importantes del siglo XX. Esta psicoterapia existencial otorga preeminencia a la dimensión noética o espiritual de la salud, que ha sido, sin embargo, totalmente obviada en el debate naturalismo/normativismo propio de la filosofía de la medicina. Por ello, en este escrito tratamos de mostrar de qué modo (...) las aportaciones teóricas de Viktor Frankl pueden contribuir a la discusión filosófica acerca del estatuto ontológico de la enfermedad, especialmente en el ámbito polémico dela psiquiatría. (shrink)

RESUMEN: Frankl abre una puerta a la esperanza con la dimensión suprahumana, define la religión como la búsqueda del sentido último y apuesta por una fe incondicional que otorga sentido al sufrimiento de las víctimas. Unamuno, angustiado y sufriente, se bate con su fe (una fe dubitativa –la duda, aunque se transforme en agonía, es crucial para Unamuno). Unamuno cree porque anhela creer (por necesidad); Frankl cree existencialmente (por de- cisión). En este artículo expongo los diferentes acercamientos de (...) Frankl y Unamuno a la fe (exponiendo también las tesis de otros filósofos, teólogos y supervivientes de la Shoah) y muestro cómo estas aproximaciones abren una puerta a la esperanza (y al sentido del sufrimiento de las víctimas de la Shoah). / Palabras clave: dimensión suprahumana, escatología, esperanza, fe dubitativa, fe in- condicional, Holocausto, inmortalidad, Shoah, sufrimiento de las víctimas, Unamuno, Viktor Frankl. /// ABSTRACT: Frankl opens a door to hope with the suprahuman dimension, defines religion as the search for an ultimate meaning and has an uncoditional faith that gives meaning to the victims' suffering. Unamuno, anguished and suffering, struggles with his faith (a faith which is a doubting faith –doubt, even if it turns into agony, is crucial for Unamuno). Unamuno believes because he longs to believe (out of necessity); Frankl believes existen- tially (out of decision). In this paper, I discuss Frankl's and Unamuno's different ap- proaches to faith (presenting theses of other philosophers, theologians and Shoah survivors as well), showing how these approaches open a door to hope (and to the meaning of the suffering of the victims of the Shoah). / Keywords: doubting faith, eschatology, Holocaust, hope, immortality, Shoah, supra- human dimension, Unamuno, unconditional faith, victims' suffering, Viktor Frankl. (shrink)

Viktor Frankl’s Logotherapy is based on Max Scheler’s theory of values and anthropology. Frankl builds his psychological thinking based on critical concepts of Schelerian thinking such as (i) value and goods, (ii) will and feelings, (iii) the hierarchy of values, and (iv) the idea of person. It is with them that he develops his original theses of (i) the spiritual motivation of human action, (ii) the search for meaning and (iii) the spiritual unconscious. In doing so, he (...) offered not only a psychotherapy of values, but also a new theory of positive human motivation, not conceived as a result of deficiency or need, but as a result of the free spirit toward objective values. The human search for meaning in life can only be successful by living and realizing superior values, in the hierarchical sense proposed by Scheler. (shrink)

Logophilosophy is based on the philosophical system of doctrines developed by Viennese psychiatrist and doctor of philosophy Viktor Frankl (1905-1997). The two consisting elements of this philosophical system of doctrines i.e. Logophilosophy, are Existential analysis and Logotherapy. Existential analysis aims to explore, understand and explain being-in-the-world concerning both humankind in general and each human individually. Logotherapy applies Existential analysis in practice. Logophilosophy is a purpose-centered philosophy, which includes basic pillars of the purposeful nature of life, the human will (...) to find a purpose, and the freedom of human will. However, implementing purposes in everyone's own life is very different from creating meanings for one's life. Purposes are always outside of a human, in the world, to which we are related through and in accordance with our own existence. Purposes cannot be invented or created, but they are found. A purposeful life also always commits to values that are objective and the same for everyone. Together, purpose and values form the logophilosophical backbone of human activity in the world, which needs selflessness and joint efforts to become what it can be at its best. (shrink)

Resumo: A Logoterapia proposta por Viktor Frankl está fundamentada na teoria dos valores e antropologia de Max Scheler. Frankl constrói seu pensamento psicológico baseado em conceitos-chave do pensamento scheleriano como (i) o valor e os bens, (ii) o querer e os sentimentos, (iii) a hierarquia de valores e (iv) a ideia de pessoa. É com eles que desenvolve suas teses originais da (i) motivação espiritual da ação humana, (ii) busca de sentido e (iii) inconsciente espiritual. Ao fazê-lo, (...) ofereceu não só uma psicoterapia dos valores, mas também uma nova teoria da motivação humana positiva, não concebida como fruto de deficiência ou necessidade, mas do espírito livre direcionado a valores objetivos. A busca humana por sentido na vida só é possível ser bem-sucedida com a vivência e realização de valores superiores, no sentido hierárquico proposto por Scheler. (shrink)

RESUMEN (ES): ¿Es posible una moral sin Dios (Jean-Paul Sartre) o con un dios que existe en una dimensión suprahumana (Viktor Frankl)? La famosa "cita" de Dostoyevski ("Si Dios no existe, todo está permitido") no fue escrita así por Dostoyevski. El Holocausto, como punto de inflexión e interrupción en la historia, la filosofía y la teología, abre nuevos interrogantes "después" de Auschwitz. En el presente artículo discuto la moral sartreana y la frankleana, analizando la famosa "cita" de Dostoyevski (...) y preguntándome si acaso una moral con un dios ausente es capaz de prevenir futuras barbaries. /// ABSTRACT (EN): Is it possible a morality without God (Jean-Paul Sartre) or with a God that exists in a suprahuman dimension (Viktor Frankl)? The famous «quote» by Dostoevsky («If God does not exist, everything is permitted») was not written like that by Dostoevsky. The Holocaust, as a turning point and as an interruption in history, philosophy, and theology, opens new questions «after» Auschwitz. In this paper, I discuss Sartrean and Franklean morality while analyzing the famous «quote» by Dostoevsky and wondering if a morality with an absent God can prevent future barbarities. (shrink)

The humanity is examined on two levels: first as a natural biological quality having a moral dimension and a moral impact, and then as a moral quality, which is a specific human product and a result of cultural evolution, i.e. of human moral deve-lopment. According to the forms of the realized humanity the author differentiates between active and passive forms of humanity; the active humanity is further divided into a positive and a negative ones.

The attempt to define meaning arouses numerous questions, such as whether life can be meaningful without actions devoted to a central purpose or whether the latter guarantee a meaningful life. Communities of inquiry are relevant in this context because they create relationships within and between people and the environment. The more they address relations—social, cognitive, emotional, etc.—that tie-in with the children’s world even if not in a concrete fashion, the more they enable young people to search for and find meaning. (...) Examining the way in which philosophical communities of inquiry serve as a dialogical space that enables a search for meaning on the personal and collective plane, this article seeks to expand the discussion of how/whether finding meaning on a private or communal level can promote recognition of the existential uniqueness of each individual and the development of a sense of responsibility for him or her. Grounded in the writings of Matthew Lipman, it links his ideas about finding meaning in philosophical communities of inquiry with those of Jean-Paul Sartre, Viktor Frankl, and Emmanuel Levinas, in particular with regard to the association between meaning and responsibility. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose the concept of the “animated persona,” a soundless voice that says, “I am here” and appears on the surface of someone or something. This concept can bring clarity to the experience of perceiving a kind of personhood on a corpse, a wooden mask, or even a tree. In the first half of this paper, I will examine some Japanese literature and a work of Viktor Frankl’s that discuss these phenomena. In the second half, (...) I will analyze the concept of animated persona from five perspectives: (1) a compelling power, (2) surface-ness, (3) religious experience, (4) universality, and (5) the meaning of “I.” Lastly, I will discuss the relationship among the three layers of biological object, animated persona, and self-conscious being. My aim is to shed new light on the meaning of the encounter between the living and the dead. (shrink)

Pessimists sometimes declare that death makes everything we do pointless or meaningless. In this essay, I consider the motivations for this worry about our collective mortality. I then examine some common responses to this worry that emphasize moderating our standards or changing our goals. Given some limitations of the “moderating our standards” response, I suggest that Viktor Frankl’s view about the permanence of the past offers a different and perhaps better way of responding to the worry that death (...) renders our lives meaningless. After outlining his view, its implications, and the view of time it assumes, I consider and respond to some possible objections to Frankl’s view. If Frankl is right, death cannot make life meaningless or pointless because meaning is attained within life, and when we die our completed lives endure as part of the past. (shrink)

This argument explores the profound connection between love, pleasure, and the search for meaning in life. It asserts that nearly every person is entitled to experience love, which provides the most fulfilling form of pleasure and a foundation for personal purpose. Drawing from philosophical works by Carl Rogers, Aristotle, and Viktor Frankl, the argument weaves together ethical imperatives and existential reflections. It concludes by affirming love’s centrality in human flourishing and its role in creating a meaningful existence.

Este documento analiza la dinámica de la economía informal en América Latina por efecto de la pandemia Covid-19, con enfoque en el sentido proyectivo de la vida. El impacto sin precedentes sobre las plazas de trabajo y las estimaciones indican que, en 2022, este flagelo disminuirá, no obstante, la economía informal representa más del 50% de los empleos de la región. La narrativa sobre el hábito económico, social, cultural y la afirmación en la conciencia de la vida como entropía negativa, (...) puede ser el nuevo axioma existencial que procure la recuperación paulatina del sentido. ¿Se podrán mantener condiciones de informalidad laboral y de precarización, aun cuando estos se han hecho más informales y precarios? A modo de respuesta, Viktor Frankl dijo una vez “Si tenemos un “por qué”, siempre encontraremos un “cómo”. Si nos sentimos libres y motivados, siempre podremos generar todos los cambios necesarios para crear una realidad mucho más noble”. (shrink)

Some people claim that death makes our lives meaningless. Bernard Williams and Viktor Frankl have made the opposite claim that death gives meaning to life. Although there has been much scrutiny of the former claim, the latter claim has received very little attention. In this paper, I will explore whether and how death gives meaning to our lives. As I will argue, there is not sufficient support for the strong claim that death is necessary for one's life to (...) be meaningful. However, there is support for the more limited conclusion that our finitude enhances or upholds the meaning in the lives of some individuals in four different ways. (shrink)

The meaning of one’s existence on earth is one of the most striking issues in our time and it cannot be neglected in the society at large. It is a pure humanitarian function and a step towards man's existence and the useful utilization of this existence. As a matter of fact, some persons do not consider suffering as a stage or an unavoidable meaning of life. These persons then opt for suicide as a means of avoiding suffering and hardship in (...) life; but the question is: does suicide transcend suffering and hardship? Viktor Frankl in his book Man’s Search for Meaning, through his experience in the concentration camp emphasized that even in the brutish and most inconsiderate circumstance, man’s existence should not be centered only on when man is enjoying the good things of nature and his existence as a being, but also when the human person is faced with challenges and through this, the attitude he takes to solve these challenges shows the authentic and inauthentic nature of the human person. This work examined Viktor Frankl’s existentialism in respect to suicide and his principle of logotherapy as a means of alleviating the problem of suicide, using the philosophical methods of critical/logical analysis and reflection. -/- . (shrink)

Fericirea este un concept fuzzy. Ea poate fi definită în termeni de a trăi o viață bună sau de a înflori, mai degrabă decât de a experimenta o emoție. Fericirea în acest sens a fost folosită pentru a traduce eudaimonia greacă și este încă folosită în etica virtuții. A existat o tranziție în timp, de la accent pe fericirea virtuții la virtutea fericirii. În psihologie, fericirea este o stare mentală sau emoțională a bunăstării, care poate fi definită, printre altele, de (...) emoții pozitive sau plăcute, variind de la mulțumire până la bucuria intensă. În Vedele hinduse, ānanda semnifică fericirea veșnică, cea care însoțește sfârșitul ciclului de renaștere. Pentru grecii antici, ataraxia este o stare lucidă de echilibru robust, caracterizată de elibertatea continuă de teama primejdiei și îngrijorare. Filosofii consideră că fericirea poate fi înțeleasă ca fiind scopul moral al vieții sau ca aspect al hazardului, explicând fericirea fie ca o stare de spirit, fie ca o viață înfloritoare pentru persoana căreia i se aplică. „Conceptul de fericire este un concept atât de vag încât, în ciuda dorinței fiecărui om de a fi fericit, nimeni nu poate spune niciodată în termeni preciși și coerent ce vrea și dorește cu adevărat. Motivul este că elementele care fac parte din conceptul de fericire sunt în totalitate empirice, adică trebuie împrumutate din experiență, și că în același timp, pentru ideea fericirii, un întreg absolut, este necesar un maxim de bunăstare în starea actuală și cea viitoare. Ori, este imposibil ca o persoană finită să fie atât de perspicace și, în același timp, atât de puternică încât să se presupună că poate crea un concept cert despre ceea ce își dorește cu adevărat. Bogăție? ... Cunoaștere? ... Viață lungă? .. Sănătate? Prin urmare, nu există, în acest sens, un imperativ care să ne impună în sensul strict al cuvântului ce să facem pentru a fi fericiți, deoarece fericirea este un ideal nu al rațiunii, ci al imaginației." (Emmanuel Kant, Critica facultății de judecată) -/- CUPRINS: -/- Fericirea - Definiție - Legătura cu sănătatea fizică - Filozofie - Religie - - Religiile orientale - - - Budism - - - Hinduism - - - Confucianismul - - Religiile abrahamice - - - Iudaismul - - - Catolicismul roman - - - Islam - Psihologie - - Ierarhia nevoilor a lui Maslow - - Teoria autodeterminării - - Psihologie pozitivă - - Măsurarea fericirii - Viziunea economică și politică Ānanda - Diferite sensuri de fericire în filosofia hindusă - - Swami Vivekananda - - Sri Aurobindo - - Advaita vedanta - - Dvaita vedanta - - Vishishtadvaita vedanta - - Sri Ramana Maharshi - Modalități de realizare a ānandei Ataraxia - Epicureismul - Pironism - Stoicism Indici ai fericirii: Fericirea Națională Brută - Definirea FNB - Implementarea FNB în Bhutan - Răspândirea FNB în afara Bhutan - Critica Filosofia fericirii - Grecia antică - - Platon - - Aristotel - - Cinism - - Cirenaicism - - Pironism - - Epicureism - - Stoicism - Roma antică - - Școala lui Sextius - - Augustin de Hippo - - Boețiu - Evul Mediu - - Avicenna - - Al-Ghazali - - Maimonide - - Thomas de Aquino - Perioada modernă timpurie - - Michel de Montaigne - - Jeremy Bentham - - Arthur Schopenhauer - Perioada contemporană - - Władysław Tatarkiewicz - - Herbert Marcuse - - Viktor Frankl - - Robert Nozick - Scientismul - Studiul fericirii - - Sonja Lyubomirsky Teoria (etica) virtuții - Concepte cheie - Istoria virtuții - - „Turnura aretaică” contemporană Consecințialism - Filosofii - - Consecințialismul de stat - - Utilitarism - - Egoismul etic - - Altruismul etic - - Consecințialismul regulilor - - Consecințialismul pe două niveluri - - Consecințialismul motivațional - - Consecințialism negativ - - Etica teleologică - - Actele și omisiunile, și "doctrina actelor și omisiunilor" Referințe Despre autor - Nicolae Sfetcu - - De același autor - - Contact Editura - MultiMedia Publishing . (shrink)

We present results from a single case study based on semi-structured interviews with a student (a boy in school year 3) diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder and his school staff after participating in a short and small-scale intervention carried out in a socio-economically disadvantaged Swedish elementary school in 2019. The student participated in a seven week long intervention with a total of 12 philosophical dialogues (ranging from 45 to 60 minutes). Two facilitators, both with years of facilitation experience and teacher (...) degree and at least BA in philosophy, facilitated the majority of the dialogues and mainly followed a ”routine” procedure. The student was interviewed in direct connection to the end of the intervention about his experiences from the dialogues and his perceptions about whether and how the dialogues had influenced him. The student’s two teachers, who had participated in the dialogues as participants, were interviewed as a pair, also in direct connection to the end of the intervention, while the school principal was interviewed two years after the study. These staff interviews concerned the staff’s experiences of the influence of the dialogues on the students within the intervention as well as transfer effects to other contexts in school. The data from the study include detailed elaborations from a student perspective of different effects on the student’s communicative and cognitive development, which are in several respects supported also by staff reports. The results show that the student was able, interested, and willing to participate in philosophical dialogues, and our data point to several positive outcomes for the student in the communicative and cognitive domains. (shrink)

Behavioural techniques or ‘nudges’ can be used for various purposes. In this paper, we shift the focus from government nudges to nudges used by for-profit market agents. We argue that potential worries about nudges circumventing the deliberative capacities or diminishing the control of targeted agents are greater when it comes to market nudges, given that these (1) are not constrained by the principles that regulate government nudges (mildness, sensitivity to people’s interests and public justifiability) and (2) are often ‘stacked’ – (...) they come in great numbers that overwhelm agents. In addition, we respond to possible objections and derive several policy suggestions. (shrink)

This essay explores the implications of historicising John Rawls’s theory of justice. While historical research on Rawls and his social context has provided valuable insights, some scholars argue that historicising carries significant philosophical consequences. This paper critically examines one such argument that contends that historicising Rawls’s theory demonstrates its contextual nature, undermines its diagnostic powers, and leads to its complete dissolution. We offer a reconstruction of this argument and show that it fails. Further, while we argue that this argument fails, (...) we go on to suggest that historical evidence may contribute to a defensive argument against appeals to expert opinion. By examining the appropriate relationship between historical research and philosophy, this essay contributes to the evaluation of the historicist critique and offers insights into the broader role of historical research in philosophical discourse. (shrink)

We paraphrase Descartes’ famous dictum in the area of AI ethics where the “I doubt and therefore I am” is suggested as a necessary aspect of morality. Therefore AI, which cannot doubt itself, cannot possess moral agency. Of course, this is not the end of the story. We explore various aspects of the human mind that substantially differ from AI, which includes the sensory grounding of our knowing, the act of understanding, and the significance of being able to doubt ourselves. (...) The foundation of our argument is the discipline of ethics, one of the oldest and largest knowledge projects of human history, yet, we seem only to be beginning to get a grasp of it. After a couple of thousand years of studying the ethics of humans, we (humans) arrived at a point where moral psychology suggests that our moral decisions are intuitive, and all the models from ethics become relevant only when we explain ourselves. This recognition has a major impact on what and how we can do regarding AI ethics. We do not offer a solution, we explore some ideas and leave the problem open, but we hope somewhat better understood than before our study. (shrink)

Recently, there have been attempts at offering new justifications of the Rawlsian idea of public reason. Blain Neufeld has suggested that the ideal of political autonomy justifies public reason, while R.J. Leland and Han van Wietmarschen have sought to justify the idea by appealing to the value of political community. In this paper, I show that both proposals are vulnerable to a common problem. In realistic circumstances, they will often turn into reasons to oppose, rather than support, public reason. However, (...) this counterintuitive result can be avoided if we conceive of autonomy and community differently. (shrink)

According to John Rawls’s famous Liberal Principle of Legitimacy, the exercise of political power is legitimate only if it is justifiable to all citizens. The currently dominant interpretation of what is justifiable to persons in this sense is an internalist one. On this view, what is justifiable to persons depends on their beliefs and commitments. In this paper I challenge this reading of Rawls’s principle, and instead suggest that it is most plausibly interpreted in externalist terms. On this alternative view, (...) what is justifiable to persons is not in any way dependent on, or relativized to, their beliefs and commitments. Instead, what is justifiable to all in the relevant sense is what all could accept as free and equal. I defend this reinterpretation of the view by showing how it is supported by Rawls’s account of the freedom and equality of persons. In addition, a considerable advantage of this suggestion is that it allows for an inclusive account of to whom the exercise of political power must be made justifiable. (shrink)

Timothy Michael Fowler has argued that, as a consequence of their commitment to neutrality in regard to comprehensive doctrines, political liberals face a dilemma. In essence, the dilemma for political liberals is that either they have to give up their commitment to neutrality (which is an indispensible part of their view), or they have to allow harm to children. Fowler’s case for this dilemma depends on ascribing to political liberals a view which grants parents a great degree of freedom in (...) deciding on the education of their children. I show that ascribing this view to political liberals rests upon a misinterpretation of political liberalism. Since political liberals have access to reasons based upon the interests of children, they need not yield to parent’s wishes about the education of their children. A correct understanding of political liberalism thus shows that political liberals do not face the dilemma envisaged by Fowler. (shrink)

This paper considers the view that the basis of equality is the range property of being a moral person. This view, suggested by John Rawls in his A Theory of Justice (1971), is commonly dismissed in the literature. By defending the view against the criticism levelled against it, I aim to show that this dismissal has been too quick. The critics have generally failed to fully appreciate the fact that Rawls's account is restricted to the domain of distributive justice. On (...) Rawls's view distributive justice is a matter of the fair terms of cooperation among the participants of a system of social cooperation. I argue that this understanding of distributive justice can provide a compelling rationale for considering moral personality as the basis of equality for this domain of morality. That moral persons are indeed equal is further supported by an intuitive argument concerning the irrelevance of morally arbitrary factors, giving us reasons to believe that varying capacities among moral persons does not result in an unequal moral status. The dismissal of Rawls's account of equality has thus been premature, and it remains an important view to consider. (shrink)

John Rawls A Theory of Justice har haft ett monumentalt inflytande på den moderna politiska filosofin. Jag försöker här genom några nedslag i den nutida diskussionen förmedla en bild av detta inflytande, och av bokens fortsatta filosofiska relevans. Jag inleder med en kort presentation av huvuddragen i Rawls rättviseteori. Efter det går jag igenom, och bemöter, kritiken mot idealteori. Jag diskuterar sedan förhållandet mellan rättvisa och ekonomisk ojämlikhet, och förklarar varför teorin är radikalare än vad många kritiker insett. Slutligen går (...) jag igenom hur en kontraktsteori av detta slag kan hantera frågan om rättvisa mellan generationer. (shrink)

A recent report by the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention in cooperation with the Swedish Security Service shows that the Internet has been extensively used to spread propaganda by proponents of violent political extremism, characterized by a worldview painted in black and white, an anti-democratic viewpoint, and intolerance towards persons with opposing ideas. We provide five arguments suggesting that philosophical dialogue with young persons would be beneficial to their acquisition of insights, attitudes and thinking tools for encountering such propaganda. (...) The arguments are based on stated requirements for problem solutions given by experts in violent political extremism, recent research about the effects of philosophical dialogue in young persons’ thinking skills, and parts of the basic theoretical framework of Philosophy for Children. Philosophical dialogues seem a promising way for young people to achieve a stronger democratic awareness and a more tenacious resistance against extremist views online. (shrink)

We examine the relationship between scientific methods and religious perspectives using the example of theoretical physics' understanding of observable natural phenomena. Through a straightforward logical construction, we argue that not only are scientific and metaphysical viewpoints not contradictory, but the existence of the latter is strongly suggested by the former.

Persons with aphasia suffer from a loss of communication ability as a consequence of a brain injury. A small strand of research indicates effec- tiveness of dialogic interventions for communication development for persons with aphasia, but a vast amount of research studies shows its effectiveness for other target groups. In this paper, we describe the main parts of the hitherto technological development of an application named Dialogica that is (i) aimed at facilitating increased communicative participation in dialogic settings for persons (...) with aphasia and other communication disorders, (ii) based on comput- er game technology as well as on theory in dialogic education and argumenta- tion theory, and (iii) designed for mobile devices with larger screens. (shrink)

This essay defends the claim that endogenous attention is necessary for the justification of perceptual beliefs. I criticize the so-called phenomenal approach, according to which perceptual experiences provide justification in virtue of being phenomenally conscious. I specifically target Siegel and Silins’ (2014 ; 2019) version of the phenomenal approach. As against their view, I claim that perceptual justification cannot be understood without reference to the cognitive mechanisms which underlie the mobilization of reasons in support of propositional attitudes – attention being (...) instrumental to those very mechanisms. Relying on the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification, I first criticize the alleged cases of justification in the absence of attention before elaborating a two-stage argument in favor of the necessity of attention for perceptual justification. In the first stage, I contend that the functional role of endogenous attention makes it a necessary condition for doxastic justification. In the second stage, by relying on Turri’s (2010) analysis, I establish that propositional justification itself necessitates attention. (shrink)

In this paper, we describe technological advances for supporting persons with aphasia in philosophical dialogues about personally relevant and contestable questions. A computer game-based application for iPads is developed and researched through Living Lab inspired workshops in order to promote the target group’s communicative participation during group argumentation. We outline some central parts of the background theory of the application and some of its main features, which are related to needs of the target group. Methodological issues connected to the design (...) and use of Living Labs with persons with aphasia are discussed. We describe a few problems with researching development of communicative participation during group argumentation using an app assisted intervention for the target group and suggest some possible solutions. (shrink)

We sketch an account according to which the semantic concepts themselves are not pathological and the pathologies that attend the semantic predicates arise because of the intention to impose on them a role they cannot fulfill, that of expressing semantic concepts for a language that includes them. We provide a simplified model of the account and argue in its light that (i) a consequence is that our meaning intentions are unsuccessful, and such semantic predicates fail to express any concept, and (...) that (ii) in light of this it is incorrect to characterize the pathology simply as semantic inconsistency; a more nuanced view of the problem is needed. We also show that the defects of the semantic predicates need not undercut the use of a truth theory in a compositional semantics for a language containing them because the meaning theory per se need not involve commitment to the axioms of the truth theory it exploits. (shrink)

Current approaches used in educational research and practice to evaluate the quality of written arguments often rely on structural analysis. In such assessments, credit is awarded for the presence of structural elements of an argument, such as claims, evidence, and rebuttals. In this article, we discuss limitations of such approaches, including the absence of criteria for evaluating the quality of the argument elements. We then present an alternative framework, based on the Rational Force Model (RFM), which originated from the work (...) of a Nordic philosopher Næss. Using an example of an argumentative essay, we demonstrate the potential of the RFM to improve argument analysis by focusing on the acceptability and relevance of argument elements, two criteria widely considered to be fundamental markers of argument strength. We outline possibilities and challenges with using the RFM in educational contexts and conclude by proposing directions for future research. (shrink)

The high prevalence of brain injury incidents in adolescence and adulthood demands effective models for re-learning lost cognitive abilities. Impairment in brain injury survivors’ higher-level cognitive functions is common and a negative predictor for long-term outcome. We conducted two small-scale interventions (N = 12; 33.33% female) with persons with acquired brain injuries in two municipalities in Sweden. Age ranged from 17 to 65 years (M = 51.17, SD = 14.53). The interventions were dialogic, inquiry-based, and inspired by the Philosophy for (...) Children Programme, a participatory thinking skills approach with documented higher-order cognitive outcomes, such as developed argumentation skills, in other target groups. Philosophical dialogues were conducted once a week in the two groups, totalling 12 dialogues per group. Group argumentation development was measured through compared scores from structured observations of filmed dialogues early and late in the intervention. Large positive changes in mean scores from early to late in the intervention, together with constantly high facilitator quality, suggest argumentation development in the sample due to the intervention. (shrink)

One of the most legendary educational books ever written is Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s “Émile ou de l’Education”. Most obviously Rousseau wrote this book guided by diverse more or less conscious purposes and one of the main problems it presents is paradoxical: Does education have to promote freedom by force? In this article I will, firstly, present several aims that might have triggered Rousseau to write “Émile”. Secondly, I will discuss Rousseau’s view of the so called “educational paradox”. Since this quandary touches (...) the topic of many other of his books, I will discuss “Émile” along with Rousseau’s other works and thus place his educational story in his “great narrative”. (shrink)

Émile Durkheim: Coesão e Fato Social -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva E-mails: [email protected] / [email protected] WhatsApp: (82)9.8143-8399 -/- Émile Durkheim: Coesão e Fato Social Nascido em 1858, Durkheim era francês e foi bastante influenciado pela obra do filósofo também francês Augusto Comte (1798-1857), que metodizou pela primeira vez o estudo da sociedade (Sociologia) como uma ciência particular e peculiar, e que também conectou a Sociologia com alguns artífices peculiares das Ciências Naturais. Em contrapartida, Durkheim procurou alicerçar a Sociologia como (...) uma ciência social divergente em toda sua totalidade das ciências naturais. Logo, mediante essa finalidade, cuidou em desenvolver uma tese e um artifício de análise que contivesse conceitos peculiares para a instrução da vida em corpo social. Doravante, os princípios da sociologia de Émile Durkheim podem ser reduzidos as alcunhas ou conceitos de coesão, da segmentação do trabalho (ou especialização do trabalho) e de ação, circunstância ou fato social. Ao analisar acerca da divisão do trabalho no corpo social, Durkheim explana: [...] a divisão do trabalho [...] não serviria apenas para dotar nossas sociedades de luxo, invejável talvez, mas supérfluo; ela seria uma condição de existência da sociedade. Graças à divisão do trabalho, ou pelo menos por seu intermédio, se garantiria a coesão social; ela determinaria os traços essenciais da constituição da sociedade. Por isso mesmo, caso seja essa realmente a função da divisão do trabalho, ela deve ter um caráter moral, porque as necessidades de ordem, de harmonia e de solidariedade social são geralmente consideradas morais. Vale salientar que, Émile Durkheim foi inteiramente influenciado pelos acontecimentos históricos que se decorrera nos séculos XVIII e XIX. Todo o continente europeu, ao passo do século XIX ascendeu em derredor dos princípios da Revolução Industrial e da Revolução Francesa. A primeira (Revolução Industrial), tendo sua introdução aos meados do século XVIII, exacerbou atrozmente a produção de mercadorias. Aproveitando-se dos avanços tecnológicos incorporados nas indústrias, a produção industrial na Inglaterra, ao passo do século XVIII, disseminou-se para demais países europeus no século seguinte, transfigurando-se como o âmago central de estruturação da vida sodalícia. A segunda (Revolução Francesa), com seu desencadeamento em 1789, foi inteiramente marcada por metamorfoses políticas estruturais. O corpo social feudalista, que antepor-se ao sodalismo capitalista, foi crepusculada. Todas as estruturas políticas do corpo feudalista deram lugar a hegemonia das organizações políticas capitalistas. O regime monárquico foi finalizado e comutado por entidades políticas que se apropriavam de ideais como a liberdade, a igualdade e a fraternidade, tal qual era o próprio lema da Revolução Francesa. As instituições de educação, antes dominadas e ditadas pela hegemônica Igreja católica, passaram a ser administradas pelo Estado, fazendo com que as mesmas se tornassem leigas. A chamada livre-iniciativa ou o processo em que ocorre o escambo de mercadorias foi exortado por novíssimas regras e leis estabelecidas sob a perspectiva da produção das indústrias, que estavam sob ascensão constante. Ao passo do fim do século XIX, Émile Durkheim percebia atentamente essa ascensão notória do processo de metamorfose social, particularmente instigada pela indústria, e buscava entender esse processo para elucidar o seguinte inquietamento: como pode esse corpo social capitalista, que se fragmenta e qualifica-se em funções cada vez mais divergentes, assegurar uma unicidade, uma coesão social? Pois bem, o autor buscou uma elucidação sociológica para essa questão pragmática. O sociólogo buscou compreender a unicidade social em um mundo cada vez mais fragmentado pela qualificação do trabalho. O mesmo, perguntava-se como os sujeitos distintos, em cargos sociais heterogêneos, poderiam constituir-se socialmente. Buscando uma elucidação, alicerçada nos preceitos sociológicos, desse processo de diferenciação, o autor francês apropriou-se da seguinte hipótese: todo o corpo social, de indivíduos distintos, são definidos por algum tipo de fragmentação (aprimoramento) do trabalho. Isto é, no decorrer do desenvolvimento dos corpos sociais, os sujeitos tendem a se tornarem cada vez mais heterogêneos. Em um corpo social com a mínima fragmentação do trabalho, os sujeitos são mais análogos entre si quando cotejados aos demais que vivem sob um corpo social em que o trabalho é majoritariamente fragmentado. É mediante a essa ótica que o sociólogo francês atenta sobre a coesão social, isto é, o estágio de incorporação de cada corpo social. Em corpos sociais onde o trabalho é predominantemente fragmentado é observada uma dinâmica dupla. Concomitantemente a ocorrência da distinção profissional, é criada o que Durkheim chama de interdependência funcional, isto é, alcunha para designar a dependência recíproca dos indivíduos num mundo onde o trabalho é puramente fragmentado. Os vínculos sociais e a teia de interdependência, definem uma forma de coesão social. Em corpos sociais em que o trabalho não é puramente fragmentado, são as crenças que asseguram a unicidade dos sujeitos, uma vez que o processo de aprimoramento das funções profissionais ainda são puramente arcaicos. Aclarando melhor o supracitado texto, vamos cotejar dois corpos sociais: um corpo social feudal e outro industrial. Pois bem, em um sodalismo feudal hipotético, a fragmentação do trabalho é proveniente alicerçada pelas atividades majoritariamente agrícolas. Os indivíduos servis laboram majoritariamente para o benefício do senhor feudal e a parte restante de seu tempo é para laborar em proveito da sua subsistência e de seu grupo familiar. As metodologias do labor são puramente arcaicas e as práticas de trabalho se resumem em plantar, colher e cuidar dos animais. As metodologias produtivos apropriadas pelos diferentes feudos acabam por ser predominantemente análogas, logo, não há muita distinção entre os sujeitos. Em detrimento ao corpo social feudalista, no corpo industrial, há uma acentuada fragmentação do labor, em que homens e mulheres acabam por exercer funções agudamente distintas. Existem lavadeiras, mecânicos, operários, pedreiros, marceneiros, merchandisings, professores, comerciantes, etc., citando uma parcela ligeiramente pequena das profissões existentes nesse sodalismo e que, mediante essas profissões, ainda há uma fragmentação destas, originando várias subdivisões. Elucidando o anteriormente citado, entre os professores estão aqueles que lecionam Português, Ciências, Filosofia, Antropologia, Sociologia, Educação Física, etc. Para Émile Durkheim, esses corpos sociais são puramente aprimorados, e têm maior estágio de fragmentação profissional, o que gera a caracterização dos sujeitos distintos entre si. A secção do labor é, para o autor, um ingrediente social de impulsionamento da ascensão dos corpos sociais. Os ofícios sociais são primordiais para sua análise, logo, a Sociologia de Durkheim é alcunhada de “funcionalista”. Não obstante, para meditar mais sobre a fragmentação do labor, o autor criou outros preceitos fundamentais. Um deles é o conceito de fato social, primordial para a definição do que é peculiar ou não da Sociologia. Com a finalidade de gerar preceitos com uma maior robustez possível, Durkheim compreendia que o fato social era como uma coisa, um fato tão apreensível quanto qualquer componente ou unidade física ou biológica. Os fenômenos sociais seriam, mediante o supracitado, formas de cogitar, vivenciar e proceder que exercem uma coerção (força) externa sobre os sujeitos sodalísticos. Para o autor, o corpo social vinha antes que todos os sujeitos e procedera sobre os mesmos, caracterizando suas formas de ser. Com isso, um fato social poder-se-ia ser identificado com base nessa força ou coerção social compulsória a um único ou mais sujeitos. Como explana o supracitado texto, só poder-se-ia ser considerado um fato social, o acontecimento que nele contivesse: 1 Generalidade (que fosse identificado em todo o corpo social); 2 Exterioridade (que seja exterior à vontade dos sujeitos); e 3 Coercitividade (que apresente uma força externa aos sujeitos e que os molde em detrimento das vontades individuais). Logo, os estudos de Émile Durkheim, além de receber a alcunha de funcionalista, recebe também a consideração de uma Sociologia estruturalista, ao passo em que, a estrutura do corpo social designaria as atitudes dos sujeitos. Na sociedade contemporânea, alguns exemplos de fatos sociais são o direito, a educação, a fragmentação do labor, às crenças religiosas e crenças políticas de divergentes espectros, os esportes, etc. O próprio futebol, a exemplo, é considerado um fato social na medida em que ele se encontra presente em todo corpo social brasileiro. Nas três características para o futebol ser considerado um fato social, ele é exterior aos sujeitos, uma vez que para ele existir não depende da vontade dos sujeitos individuais. Também é coercitivo, uma vez que impõe um padrão esportivo aos sujeitos. Diante do antepasso texto, muitos infantes e juvenis desejam ser jogadores de futebol, esse “desejo” ou sonho pode ser entendido e elucidado como uma força externa, peculiarmente social. Diante de todo o supracitado texto, observemos que, na perspectiva de Durkheim, o estudo da sociedade (Sociologia) deve ter como finalidade ou fundamento o estudo dos fatos sociais antigos, modernos e contemporâneos. Aqueles fatos que não obtiverem as três características elaboradas por Durkheim (a saber: Generalidade, Exterioridade e Coercitividade) será considerados fatos de domínio das demais ciências existentes. Pois, para finalizar, Durkheim afirma que a Sociologia é a ciência que estuda os fatos sociais. -/- EXERCÍCIO DE FIXAÇÃO DO ASSUNTO: ÉMILE DURKHEIM: COESÃO E FATO SOCIAL PROF. Lic. e Tecg°. EMANUEL ISAQUE CORDEIRO DA SILVA SOCIOLOGIA GERAL II – 17 de Maio de 2019 TURMA: 2°__ -/- Estudante:____________________________________________________________ N°:__ -/- 1 Alicerçados pelo texto supra e pelas aulas ministradas, aclare a influência de Augusto Comte sobre os estudos e a Sociologia de Émile Durkheim. 2 Durkheim teve influência direta de Comte, nada obstante, ambos divergiram quanto ao estudo e o objeto de estudo da Sociologia. Debruçados sobre o texto e lembrados pelas aulas ministradas, cite as principais divergências entre os estudos desses franceses. 3 Quais termos se reduzem a Sociologia de Durkheim? Aclare esses termos em ideias da vida contemporânea na comunidade em que vive. 4 Atente às alíneas para elucidar, posteriormente, o que se pede: “a divisão do trabalho [...] seria uma condição de existência da sociedade. [...] Graças à divisão do trabalho [...] se garantiria a coesão social. (RODRIGUES. J. A. 2000). Analise o fragmento passado e elucide a essência da divisão do trabalho para a estruturação e organização da sociedade capitalista, bem como para os avanços nos estudos de Durkheim. 5 Aclare o impacto intensivo da Revolução Industrial para o desenvolvimento da sociedade capitalista europeia e para a geração da Sociologia do autor francês Durkheim. 6 Elucide a essência da Inglaterra da Revolução Industrial que foi considerada o país estopim do âmago central de estruturação dos sujeitos e da vida em sociedade. 7 Disserte acerca do impacto intensivo da Revolução Francesa sob as esferas políticas estruturantes do século XVIII. 8 Aclare a suma importância do crepúsculo do regime feudal durante a Revolução Francesa e, posteriormente, explique a vantagem socioeconômica e política da transição do sistema feudal para a hegemonia do sistema capitalista. 9 Amparados pelo texto supra e lembrados pelas aulas anteriores, defina o lema da Revolução Francesa: Liberdade, Igualdade e Fraternidade. Depois, elucide o impacto desse lema na sociedade do século XVIII. 10 As escolas eram controladas pela Igreja Católica, com a Revolução Francesa essas instituições de ensino passaram a ser administradas pelo Estado. Elucide as vantagens da transferência do poder sobre as escolas para o desenvolvimento do ensino e da sociedade. 11 Debruçados ante o exposto texto supra e pelas aulas ministradas, elucide as vantagens e as desvantagens da fragmentação do trabalho na sociedade dos séculos XVIII e XIX. 12 Aclare o termo dinâmica dupla. 13 Elucide o que seria a interdependência funcional para Durkheim e como esse termo impactaria a sociedade contemporânea do século XXI. 14 Aclare melhor o termo fato social e, posteriormente, Elucide os termos característicos de um fato social que são a generalidade, a exterioridade e a coercitividade. 15 cite exemplos contemporâneos de fatos sociais no Brasil. 16 Por que a Sociologia de Durkheim é alcunhada de funcionalista e de estruturalista? 17 Entre em embate com Durkheim e crie um novo objeto de estudo para a Sociologia além do alicerce dos fatos sociais. Lembre-se de embasar e fundamentar bem sua teoria, uma boa ideia é a exemplificação de sua teoria na vida pragmática dos indivíduos e como seu novo objeto de estudo impactaria as esferas políticas, sociais e econômicas. (Obs.: Caso crie uma boa tese alicerçada e bem fundamentada em fatos teóricos e práticos, a nota dessa questão valerá 25% do todo). 18 Como conclusão, debruçados sobre o texto introdutório, leio atentamente após todas as questões resolvidas, para um melhor entendimento profundo, e disserte sobre todas as ideias explanadas, expondo seu ponto de vista sobre o tema, isto é, se concorda ou não, sempre usando uma fundamentação que alicerce seu ponto de vista. (Mínimo – 25 linhas/Máximo – 55 linhas). -/- De coração, boa sorte! -/- . (shrink)

The German pioneer of electrophysiology, Emil du Bois-Reymond (1818–1896), is generally assumed to have remained silent on the subject of the brain. However, the archive of his papers in Berlin contains manuscript notes to a lecture on “The Seat of the Soul” that he delivered to popular audiences in 1884 and 1885. These notes demonstrate that cerebral localization and brain function in general had been concerns of his for quite some time, and that he did not shy away from (...) these subjects. (shrink)

This essay recounts a controversy between a pioneer electrophysiologist, Emil du Bois-Reymond (1818–1896), and his student, Ludimar Hermann (1838–1914). Du Bois-Reymond proposed a molecular explanation for the slight electrical currents that he detected in frog muscles and nerves. Hermann argued that du Bois-Reymond's ‘resting currents’ were an artifact of injury to living tissue. He contested du Bois-Reymond's molecular model, explaining his teacher's observations as electricity produced by chemical decomposition. History has painted Hermann as the wronged party in this dispute. (...) I seek to set the record straight. (shrink)